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Abstract  
 
Inadequate regulation of spatial development is at the origin of the current global crisis and 
increases, in years of crisis, the unequal distribution of global wealth. The importance of the 
related risks draws attention to the systems of spatial governance and planning, through which 
States regulate the spatial development. In Europe, the countries most affected by the crisis 
have spatial planning systems that are traditionally based on the preventive assignation of 
rights for land use and development through the plan. The systems of the States that are less 
affected by the crisis have established rather that new rights for land use and for spatial 
development are assigned only after the public control of development projects and their 
distributional effects. More generally, the fact that the former model is still widely prevalent 
in the world may help to explain the global scale and the duration of the crisis. Despite the 
evidence that some models can operate better than others, the improvement of spatial 
planning systems is however limited by their complex nature of “institutional technologies”. 
In such a context, planners are especially responsible for the increase of public awareness 
concerning the role of spatial governance in economic and social life. 
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Introduction 
 
The political and technical practices used to order space play an essential role in all societies 
(Sassen, 2006). Any social and economic activity needs a space to take place and, through the 
ordering of space, can therefore be promoted, addressed or, if necessary, prevented. 
Moreover, for their deep involvement in the economic and social life, such practices 
contribute to shape the citizenship in places concerned by their action (Mazza, 2015). 
Although, for the reasons given, the origin of the spatial governance processes and of spatial 
planning practices is lost in the mists of time, their contemporary characters took shape with 
the establishment of the modern State. Every State in the world provides constitutional 
functions of spatial governance, thus setting also the conditions for the technical development 
and social affirmation of spatial planning in its institutional context. By virtue of 
constitutional powers, States exert the public control of spatial development through 
respective “systems” of spatial governance and planning. Implying the comprehensive action 
of legal devices, administrative bodies and technical cultures, these can be described as 
complex «institutional technologies» (Janin Rivolin, 2012) that allow and rule the spatial 
development in each institutional context, with the resulting consequences for the life of 
entire cities, regions and countries. 
 
Due to its long history and the most recent events, Europe has a variety of characteristics, 
which is also reflected in the different ways of ordering space through the spatial governance 
and planning. Foremost, the European continent is characterized by a very large number of 
independent States (almost a quarter of the world’s nations) in relation to its total land area, 
which is the smallest of the continents, with Oceania, amounting to less than a quarter of 
America and Asia and about one-third of Africa (Figure 1). However, this can hardly suggest 
the extreme diversity of the European territory, which is made more evident by the wide 
variety of environments, landscapes, cultures and languages (Dubbini, 2002), consolidated in 
modern times within relatively circumscribed spaces of territorial sovereignty, the States.  
 
 
Figure 1: Continental distribution of the 206 States of the world (source: it.wikipedia.org). 
 
The particularity of Europe is recognized also for the existence of the European Union (EU), a 
supranational organization of currently 28 member States (Figure 2) that, however, does not 
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hold formal powers of spatial governance and planning (Faludi, 2002; Janin Rivolin, 2010; 
Zonneveld et al., 2012; Schmitt & Van Well, 2016). In promoting “informal” spatial policies, 
the process of EU integration has nevertheless pushed for almost 30 years the comparative 
study of systems, cultures and practices of spatial governance and planning in the European 
States (Davies et al., 1989; Healey & Williams, 1993; Newman & Thornley, 1996; CEC, 
1997; Balchin et al., 1999; Larsson, 2006; ESPON, 2007; Janin Rivolin, 2008; Nadin & 
Stead, 2008, 2009; Knieling & Othengrafen, 2009; Muñoz Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010; Nadin, 
2012; Reimer et al., 2014). The results of this long-term comparison can be valuable to 
understand how different systems of spatial governance and planning may have different 
impacts on the current global crisis, especially with regard to its effects in terms of «spatial 
justice» (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 1973; Soja, 2010). One assumption in support of this 
argument is the evidence that «[i]n its causes and consequences, the global financial crisis of 
2008 was fundamentally an urban phenomenon» (Siemiatycki & Siemiatycki, 2016, p. 1258). 
Another is the «evidence that the perception of the impact of the crisis on planning has been 
different in different regions of Europe» (Kunzmann, 2016, p. 1317). 
 
 
Figure 2: Current 28 Member States of the European Union (in color) with candidate 
countries and potential candidate (in grey) (source: europa.eu). 
 
Although the functions of a spatial governance and planning system can be generalizable (e.g. 
Healey & Williams, 1993; Mazza, 2003), these comparative studies have shown that systems 
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developed over the last century in Europe operate in different ways, producing different 
specific and overall outcomes by virtue of the legal, technical and cultural characteristics that 
are attributed in various institutional contexts. With particular respect to the modalities of 
assigning rights for land use and for spatial development, the course of history has delivered 
in the world and within Europe a variety of models, which are discussed and compared in this 
paper. Without disregarding the many variables involved in such a complex issue, the 
proposed comparison is aimed at discussing how different systems of spatial governance and 
planning can affect differently the economic, social and even political life of a country. This 
may contribute to explain some main differences in the long run, and to suggest why, at least 
in Europe, some countries are suffering the current crisis more strongly than others. 
 
The next section highlights the crucial role of space in determining the unequal effects of the 
current crisis and shows how inequality is distributed differently in the EU countries. The 
following section illustrates the development of comparative research on spatial governance 
and planning systems in Europe. On this basis, the section after distinguishes the features and 
effects of the so-called “conformative”, “performative” and “neo-performative” models of 
spatial planning systems, which are currently in operation throughout Europe. A further 
section will explore the reasons and difficulties of reforming the systems of spatial 
governance and planning, despite the evidence that some models can operate better than 
others. The last section rounds off the contribution by summing up the main findings. 
 
 
Space and the effects of global crisis in Europe 
 
Since modernity, the role of space in economic and social life «is less and less neutral, more 
and more active, both as instrument and as goal, as means and as end» (Lefebvre, 1992, p. 
411). And more and more this has to deal with politics, since a «politicized space destroys the 
political conditions that brought it about», and often «the management and appropriation of 
such a space run counter to the state» (ibid., p. 416). This has become even more evident 
under the cultural conditions of postmodernity, insofar as space can be more “flexibly” 
exploited for purposes of power (Harvey, 1989). Indeed, no one should forget that the current 
global crisis, originating from the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, was triggered by a 
generalized financial speculation on the housing market under the lack of adequate 
regulations (Zandi, 2010; TFCIC, 2011). Moreover, under the lack of adequate regulations, 
urban markets are worldwide the “great space” through which the crisis is being metabolized 
through privatizing gains and socializing losses (Forrest & Yip, 2011; Fujita, 2011; Harvey, 
2012).  
 
According to Thomas Piketty (2014), one effect of the current crisis is that in many countries 
the capital (i.e. wealth in the form of real estate property and financial assets) is growing now 
at a faster pace than the economy (more precisely, with a growth rate of 4-5% vs. 1-1.5% per 
year). The income produced by capital tends to be concentrated in the hands of a small group 
of people, while labor income is dispersed through the entire population, although with 
notable contractions and the consequent use of social welfare and public spending. 
Considering that wage growth depends on the growth of the economy as a whole, if the latter 
is slower than the increase of capital income, the unequal distribution of wealth appears 
destined to be screwed into a spiral of very serious growth. Aside from suggesting the solid 
interests in favor of the continuation of the crisis, Piketty’s analysis casts ominous shadows 
beyond its technical findings, as history has shown that, beyond certain limits, social 
inequality ends up undermining the most solid democracies (Fukuyama, 2011); a risk that, 
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seventy years after the second world war, has apparently become topical again even in 
wealthy Europe (Regan, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3: Size of economy (GDP in trillions euro) and wealth per person (GDP per 
person) in the main economies of the world, 2013 (source: europa.eu). 
 
 
Figure 4: GDP per inhabitant in the 28 EU member States in 2014: index where the 
average is 100 (source: europa.eu). 
 
Although Europe is considered as a whole one of the continents most developed and richest in 
the world, the high diversity of the States that compose it is confirmed by differences of 
indicators of productive capacity and of well-being. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2016), the distribution of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the world in 2015 
varies in Europe between the 4th position of Germany and the 154th of Montenegro, and GDP 
per capita varies between the 2nd position of Luxembourg and the 104th of Kosovo. While the 
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whole EU competes with the main economies of the world (Figure 3), the level of national 
wealth is highly variable even within its borders (Figure 4).  
 
Southern European countries are the EU member States that have been most affected by the 
current crisis, and those where the unequal distribution of wealth and its increase are more 
evident. «PIGS» is an offensive acronym used in economics and finance, popularized during 
the European sovereign-debt crisis of the late 2000s, which refers to the economies of 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, four EU member States of southern Europe that were 
unable to refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their own 
(Dawber, 2015). Apart from the most known and worrying case of Greece’s impoverishment 
(Mitsopoulos & Pelagidis, 2011), the latest official studies concerning Italy show that from 
2007 to 2013 the net wealth of households decreased from 9,500 to 8,728 billion euro (2013 
prices), with a drop of over 8% (Banca d’Italia, 2014, p. 5). In the same years, the 
concentration of net wealth grew so much that in 2012 the richest 10% of the population 
owned 46.6% of the wealth (compared to 41% twenty years ago).  
 
The most widely used measure for income inequality is notoriously the “Gini coefficient”, a 
number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality (everyone has the same 
income) and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality (one person has all the income and 
everyone else has zero income). A recent comparison within the EU shows that southern 
European countries – such as Cyprus (CY), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT) and Spain 
(ES) – are among those characterized by the highest values of the Gini coefficient (Figure 5). 
The others are the post-Soviet countries of eastern Europe – Bulgaria (BG), Estonia (EE), 
Hungary (HR), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL) and Romania (RO) –, whose socio-
economic conditions of course are strongly influenced by their different political regime in 
the recent past and the sudden transition to a market economy after the 1980s. Moreover, the 
analysis of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient across the EU countries in the 
period 2008-2012 «showed high levels of inequality across southern Europe», while «there is 
no dominant pattern in central- and northern-European countries» (Di Falco, 2014, p. 2). 
 
 
Figure 5: Gini coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for disposable household 
income in EU Member States, 2012 income year (source: ec.europa.eu). 
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In light of the spatial valence of the crisis’ unequal effects, it is legitimate to ask how the 
systems of spatial governance and planning regulate the distribution of gains and losses in 
spatial development. This may «offer insights regarding how the planning apparatus in 
various different urban contexts might have been leveraged or manipulated in the run-up to 
the financial crisis» (Siemiatycki & Siemiatycki, 2016, p. 1259). The relevant suffering of 
southern European countries and cities (Knieling & Othengraphen, 2016; Ponzini, 2016) leads 
one to wonder, in particular, whether their systems counteract or rather favor the local effects 
of global crisis. If the complexity of the matter and the current lack of more specific analyses 
exclude the establishment of certain and exhaustive correlations between the operation of 
spatial governance and planning systems and the wealth distribution in each country, one can 
at least compare the different mechanisms through which different types of system manage in 
different ways the social distribution of profits and losses in spatial development. Such 
comparison is possible within Europe, thanks to international comparative research in the 
field of spatial governance and planning, which has matured in the last decades in coincidence 
with the EU integration process.   
 
 
The evolving comparison of spatial planning systems in Europe 
 
The first explicit «comparative study» of spatial planning systems in Europe (Table 1) was 
part of a survey on public control of the spatial development, commissioned by the British 
government in the late 1980s (Davies et al., 1989). Focused on five States of northwestern 
Europe – namely Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (particularly 
England) and West Germany –, this study adopted the “legal basis”, in more detailed terms of 
legal certainty provided by the system, as the sole analytical criterion. It led to distinguish two 
broad “legal families” of planning systems: a) the Continental family, based on the legal 
traditions of Roman law, the “Napoleonic Code” and the Scandinavian law, merged into the 
modern age in the juridical model of civil law; and b) the English family, inspired by the 
juridical model of the common law. In particular, while the continental legal systems «seek to 
create a complete set of abstract rules and principles in advance of decision-making […], the 
English common law system offers far fewer rules. Government does not provide a complete 
set of legal rules in advance, rather the law has been built up case-by-case as decisions of the 
courts are recorded» (Nadin & Stead, 2008, p. 38). 
 
A few years later, other British authors have tried to apply the same analytical criterion to the 
planning systems of as many as 14 European states (Newman & Thornley, 1996), taking as 
reference the models of legal system defined by the most known international studies of 
comparative constitutional law. This resulted in the distribution, rather automatic, of the 
systems analyzed in four families – i.e. Germanic, Scandinavian, Napoleonic, British – with 
the addition, in the absence of cases analyzed, of the east-European family or “in transition” 
from the Soviet influence. This initial comparative approach however proved to have various 
limitations, namely the abstraction of the real variety of the planning practices, and a tendency 
to overemphasize the role of the legal and administrative structures. Other analyses began 
therefore to consider further contextual variables, like property markets’ behaviors as 
observable in representative cities (Berry & McGreal, 1995). 
 
Also the EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (CEC, 1997), one of the 
first EU attempts to investigate the field of spatial governance and planning, adopted a more 
complex and sophisticated approach in order to position the planning systems of the then 15 
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EU member States. Here the “legal family” context is one of seven «interrelated factors» that 
were used to analyze and distinguish planning systems, namely (ibid., p. 34): 
 
1) the scope of the system; 
2) the extent and type of planning at national and regional levels; 
3) the locus of power; 
4) the relative roles of public and private sectors; 
5) constitutional provisions and administrative traditions; 
6) the maturity or completeness of the system; 
7) the distance between expressed objectives and outcomes. 
 
 
Table 1: Most known typologies of spatial planning systems in Europe (source: Nadin & 
Stead, 2009). 
 
This led to the identification of four “ideal types” of planning system existing in the EU  – 
namely «regional economic planning approach», «comprehensive integrated approach», «land 
use management», and the «urbanism tradition» (ibid., pp. 36-37) – representing approximate 
reference models to guide a deeper understanding of the concerned systems. Despite a 
considerable caution in judgments, the EU compendium makes, albeit implicitly, some first 
assumptions of comparative evaluation of systems, which are somehow suggested by the 
formulation of the last two “factors” that are listed above. At a distance of a dozen years, 
Nadin and Stead (2009) – the first was one of the compendium’s authors – have revealed the 
summary of evaluations that emerges from the intersection of the seven factors with the four 
ideal types (Table 2). In particular, this summary highlights – even if the compendium was 
careful not to make explicit these conclusions – the lower maturity of system and the wider 
distance between goals and outcomes (or lesser effectiveness) of the “urbanism tradition” 
characterizing the southern European countries. 
 
The four ideal types of the EU compendium were then applied by a later EU research project 
(ESPON, 2007), which aspired to update the analysis also in light of the EU enlargement to 
further 12 member States, with very questionable results (Nadin & Stead, 2008, pp. 39-40). 
Overall, progress and challenges in this nascent field of comparative analysis have mainly 
served to emphasize the need to define the “nature” of a system of spatial governance and 
planning for a better understanding. Further reflections on the importance of the «planning 
cultures» in guiding the operation of the systems (Sayal, 2005; Knieling & Othengraphen, 
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2009) and on the final outcomes of the systems’ action (Janin Rivolin, 2008; Muñoz Gielen & 
Tasan-Kok, 2010) have thus led to more advanced methodological considerations (Nadin, 
2012) and to more careful comparative analyses (Reimer et al., 2014).  
 
 
Table 2: Traditions and criteria from the EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems 
and Policies (source: Nadin & Stead, 2009). 
 
In the evolving debate, the idea that spatial governance and planning systems are 
«institutional technologies», developed in the course of history in order to allow the 
constituted public power to assign the individual rights for land use and for spatial 
development (Janin Rivolin, 2012), can be of particular value as regards what is discussed 
here. A technological approach, albeit aware of the institutional nature of the processes in 
question, focuses on the overall effectiveness of the system in relation to expected results. In 
the case under discussion, therefore, it helps to compare how systems based on different 
mechanisms of assignment of the rights for land use and for spatial development can achieve 
different effects in the social distribution of profits and losses in spatial development. In this 
respect, the development of comparative research has led to recognize that – excluding the 
“exception” of the eastern countries previously subjected to the influence of the Soviet regime 
(Balchin et al., 1999, pp. 161-192; Adams et al., 2011; Maier, 2012) – at least three models 
have been historically established in modern Europe, which are discussed and compared in 
the next section. 
 
 
Three models of rights assignation for spatial development 
  
The “conformative” model affecting southern Europe 
 
The institutionalization of modern spatial governance and planning put down roots in the 
phase of industrial and bourgeois revolution and the formation of modern States (Taylor, 
1998; Hall, 2002). In the past century, particularly, the pressing needs of greater urbanization, 
of Fordist development and of post-war reconstruction have supported the establishment of a 
model for the public control of space based on the ideals of hierarchy (top-down relations 
between planning tiers) and of dirigisme (State-led implementation of plans) almost 
everywhere in the world. The universal success of the model, which has resulted in a rapid 
and pervasive consolidation throughout the whole western world, depends precisely on its 
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operating through the progressive assignation of rights for land use and for spatial 
development, as the main legal effect of urban plans. In times of greatest change and 
uncertainty, this supplied first and foremost “certainty”: the system ensured both the 
investment certainties of owners and developers, and the ideological certainties of policy 
makers, public officials and reformist planners, convinced by the rampant welfarist 
paternalism that the State, as the unique holder of the collective interest, could thus “conform” 
any project of property development to its own strategy. 
 
This traditional model of a spatial planning system, still largely prevailing in the world and 
applied in southern European countries, can be labeled as the “conformative” model, as it 
pursues literally a «correspondence in form, manner, or character» or actions «in accordance 
with some specified standard or authority» (Janin Rivolin, 2008, p. 168). It pivots on a 
“preventive” binding zoning of a comprehensive urban area, which implies in general that:  
 
a) a public spatial strategy is transposed in a binding plan, which assigns rights for land 
use and for spatial development;  
b) based on this rights assignation, the delivery of building permits is subject to a control 
of the proposed development projects in terms of conformity (whether they conform to 
the plan);  
c) in cases in which projects, albeit not conforming to the plan, are considered for any 
reason preferable to the existing assignation of rights, a new plan (or a substantive 
variation of the existing one) is needed in order to assign new rights for land use and 
spatial development. 
 
Greece, Italy, Spain and, to some extent, France and Portugal have shown a structural path 
dependence on their «urbanism tradition», characterized by «a strong architectural flavour and 
concern with urban design, townscape and building control», and by regulations «undertaken 
through rigid zoning and codes» (CEC, 1997, p. 37). But this allegiance to the traditional 
model of spatial governance and planning has proven to be deleterious over time in terms of 
«public-value capturing», which means «the level at which public bodies manage to make 
developers pay for public infrastructure – infrastructure provision, public roads and space, 
public facilities and buildings, affordable and social housing – and eventually capture part of 
the economic value increase» (Muñoz Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1097).  
 
For if the public authorities claim to rule the spatial ordering through the “preventive” overall 
assignment of rights of land use and of spatial development (for the effect of zoning plans and 
variants), the first overall outcome of the model is the progressive generation of property 
incomes. While the privatization of profits derivable from the spatial development is thus 
guaranteed (even in the absence of development), this is not the case of the social loss 
compensation that may arise from development. The public control of respective projects at 
the time of issuing the building permit is in fact reduced to mere formal aspects of 
conformance with the plan. In point of law, a permit to build in conformity with the plan, 
even if the project proves to imply unexpected social costs, cannot be denied. While spatial 
development for private interests is thus incentivized, the public control of development 
projects is reduced, despite more or less genuine expectations, to a mere “administrative 
formality”, since a conformance control has little or no possibility of improving projects in 
the public interest apart from their formal coherence with the plan.  
 
But that is not all. The social losses induced by the conformative model derive also from the 
difficulties to renew public strategies of development at any scale, since their spatial 
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translation for the local implementation does not escape the preventive allocation of new 
property rights, with the consequences just summarized. Overall, the difficulty of public 
strategies and the reduction of development control to an administrative formality are a reason 
for a general decrease of political and technical accountability in spatial planning, with the 
possible creation of decision-making contexts open to patronage and corruptive practices 
(Vettoretto, 2009). And the circumstance that spatial strategies at whatever scale once agreed 
for local implementation are transfigured by what is illustrated above tends finally to trigger a 
vicious circle in the whole spatial governance process, with serious consequences in the 
progressive design of citizenship. 
 
Ultimately, the spatial planning systems that regulate the spatial ordering practices in southern 
European countries, still strongly impregnated with their “urbanism tradition” and the cult of 
preventive binding zoning as a guarantee of the public interest, are shown in fact to condition 
the public strategies of development to the advantage of the most relevant private interests. 
There are reasons to suspect therefore that, especially in these years of crisis, their operation 
may have contributed to boost – rather than alleviate – the effects of progressive social 
inequality, accelerating the process of privatization of profits and socialization of losses in the 
spatial development. Although the type of system that characterizes the southern European 
countries continues to be the most widespread in the world, however, it is not the only 
possible model. 
 
 
The British “performative” model  
 
As explained above, one remarkable price paid in exchange for the certainty afforded by the 
conformative model was the “rigidity” of public strategies, prevented in particular by the 
progressive creation of binding rights on land and of additional property incomes. Based on 
the juridical tradition of common law, the United Kingdom reacted early to this problem with 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. This law put the right to build in the hands of the 
Crown (i.e. the State) and established that «the development plan did not of itself imply that 
permission would be granted for particular developments simply because they appeared to be 
in conformity with the plan»; rather «in granting permission to develop, local authorities 
could impose “such conditions as they think fit”» (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p. 93). As a 
consequence, in the UK «[a]ll the owners were thus placed in the position of owning only the 
existing (1947) use rights and values in their land» (ibid., p. 21), and the British spatial 
planning system became «fundamentally a discretionary system in which decisions on 
particular development proposals are made as they arise, against the policy background of a 
generalised plan» (ibid., p. 92). The new system was completed by the 1968 Town and 
Country Planning Act, assigning to structure plans the provision of strategic orientations for 
development and to local plans (non-mandatory and concerning only specific areas) the 
provision of detailed guidance on land use. Despite some subsequent changes, «[t]he essential 
features of the 1968 system are still in place today» (ibid., p. 93; Nadin & Stead, 2014).  
 
This different type of spatial planning system, established in the UK (especially England) and 
in some Commonwealth countries since the post-war period (Booth, 2007), can be labeled as 
the “performative” model by virtue of its distinct address to «the execution of an action» or 
«the fulfilment of a claim, promise, or request» (Janin Rivolin, 2008, p. 168). It is based on 
indicative and non-binding zoning for the comprehensive urban area, which means in general 
that:  
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a) a public spatial strategy is transposed into a non-binding plan, i.e. not having juridical 
implications for the assignation of rights for land use and for spatial development;  
b) for this reason, the delivery of building permits is subject to control and negotiation of 
the proposed development projects in order to ensure their performance towards the 
plan (i.e. their capacity to perform the public strategy);  
c) new rights for land use and for spatial development are assigned contextually with the 
possible delivery of the building permit. 
 
Although it may seem paradoxical, removing from the spatial plan the power to establish 
rules that are legally binding does not weaken, but rather strengthens, the action of public 
authorities. Without legal obligations, the public authority manages in fact to reserve the right 
to assign new rights only to those projects that have been checked – and possibly improved, 
through control devices – in their ability to pursue (or “perform”) the spatial strategy. In this 
model, unlike the previous one, the «developmental» and «regulatory» functions of the spatial 
planning system (Healey & Williams, 1993, p. 702) are therefore well separated between the 
activities of spatial planning and of development control. As a matter of fact, in the UK «the 
main substance of the planning system is administered by governmental profession planning 
officers, either within forward planning teams (responsible for preparing planning policies) or 
development control teams (responsible for determining applications for planning permission 
by individuals and organisations)» (Tewdwr-Jones, 1996, p. 1). 
 
With the passing of time, while the urban regeneration needs have taken over on the large 
urban expansions, the performative model seems to have ensured greater “flexibility” to 
public action of spatial governance. On the other hand, uncertainty, discretionary decisions 
and higher administrative costs are the limitations complained about most frequently in the 
case of the British system (Tewdwr-Jones, 1999; Booth, 2007). The loss of certainty supplied 
by the original model is complained about mainly by property owners and developers, but 
also often by planners, whose choices and behaviors – deprived from a “legal” power – are 
more exposed to political and social judgment. 
 
 
The spread of a “neo-performative” model in north-western Europe  
 
More interestingly, despite their juridical regime of civil law and the constitutional linkage 
between land ownership and right to build (as opposed to the United Kingdom), some 
European countries have experienced over time the need to reform their spatial planning 
systems in order to pursue the effects of the performative model. The evidence of decision-
making difficulties in growing societal complexity (Dahrendorf, 1968; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973), on the one hand, and the Fordism crisis, the explosion of globalization and 
the consequent processes of spatial reorganization (Harvey, 1989; Amin & Thrift, 1994), on 
the other, have indeed highlighted further the limits of the conformative model of spatial 
governance and planning. The difficulty of plan implementation in the context of reconciling 
multilevel collective strategies to a growing plurality of local and individual projects of 
spatial development has been faced through substantial reforms in the north-western 
European countries – for instance Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands – favored 
perhaps by their traditional «comprehensive integrated approach» to spatial planning (CEC, 
1997, pp. 36-37).   
 
Sweden has tried early on to emulate the UK in establishing a spatial planning system that 
distinguishes, at the urban level, between the “general plan” (ӧversiktsplan), mandatory but 
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not legally binding, and the “detailed plan” (detaljplan), legally binding but optional for some 
limited areas (Lundström et al., 2013). Also in Germany, as confirmed with the reforms that 
followed the country’s reunification in the 1990s, the “zoning plan” (F-plan) is binding on the 
administrative activities but has no legal value on property. The legally binding tools on the 
land use are the so-called “building plans” (B-plan), which cover only some specific areas of 
the municipal territory that are generally indicated by the F-plan (Schmidt, 2009). In Denmark, 
the 2000 Planning Act introduced the concept of «municipal planning strategies», which 
meant that «the scope of planning at the municipal level was formally extended beyond its 
traditional focus on the coordination of land-use questions and the management of urban 
development to encompass more pro-active and strategic modes of planning» (Damsgaard, 
2014, p. 48). Despite the formal rigidity of the Dutch system and criticism on more recent 
reforms (Buitelaar et al., 2011), in fact, municipalities have been allowed for a long time «to 
delineate the boundaries of the plan area» without «no legal prescription [...] to determine 
when a land-use plan should be approved in relation to the rest of the development process» 
(Muñoz Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1121). This has resulted in «a collaboration between 
private and public actors […] with arrangements about the building programme, the urban 
design as well as phasing of the various aspects of the area development, supported by a land 
account, upon which the plan would ultimately be turned into a legally binding land-use plan» 
(Buitelaar & Bregman, 2016, p. 1287).  
 
A third type of spatial planning system can be thus labeled as a “neo-performative” model 
insofar as, while continuing to be based on binding zoning, it has neutralized in one way or 
another the “preventive” legal effectiveness of the plan. Rather, as discussed for the British 
model, new spatial development rights are assigned as a “final balance” after development 
projects (at least the main ones) have been negotiated, and thus controlled in detail by the 
public authority before that plan has assumed the force of law. Therefore, in this case:  
 
a) a public spatial strategy for the comprehensive urban area is used as a basis for the 
collection of projects, their control and negotiation, which are finalized to share their 
final form and substance;  
b) a binding plan assigns consequently the rights for land use and for spatial 
development;  
c) building permits are delivered according to the plan.  
 
«In the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark», in practice, «binding land-use rules 
(whether this concerns a new land-use plan or a modification of one to create new building 
possibilities) are only approved once negotiations with developers/landowners have taken 
place or, at least, when there is enough certainty about their successfully conclusion» (Muñoz 
Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1100). Despite the same juridical regime of southern European 
countries, their systems of spatial governance and planning tend thus to reproduce the 
operational advantages of the performative model in terms of “public-value capturing”. As in 
the case of the performative model, and unlike the conformative model, the neo-performative 
model prevents a “blind” pre-assignation of rights for land use and for spatial development 
through the plan, and postpones the assignation of rights after the public control of 
development projects. Privatization of profits derivable from spatial development is therefore 
not guaranteed by the plan and may even be at least partly transformed in compensation for 
social losses that could arise from the spatial development. This can occur thanks to public 
control of the spatial projects that – in the absence of acquired rights – can be extended to 
their overall performance with respect to the plan objectives.  
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Moreover, the absence of preventive assignation of new rights on property strengthens the 
political autonomy of decision-makers in the design of new spatial strategies at various scales, 
mitigating the social losses that inhibition of this autonomy tends to determine in the case of 
the conformative model. Less inhibited public strategies and the opportunity to affect the 
spatial development through an effective (not merely formal) control of projects increase, 
overall, the political and technical accountability in spatial governance, promoting the social 
and democratic transparency of the system and more responsible citizenship. 
 
 
The long and winding road of change in spatial governance 
 
Overall, the three models described above (Figure 6) show that different combinations 
between plan and control devices within a spatial governance system are possible, and can 
achieve very different effects not only in the drawing of the spatial morphologies (Tennekes 
et al., 2015), but in the whole process of spatial, economic and social ordering and in shaping 
the spatial justice and citizenship. The historical evolution of these models also shows that the 
systems of spatial governance and planning are not immutable, but may change over time. 
Moreover, a common adherence to the legal tradition of civil law and to the constitutional 
relationship between land ownership and right to build – unlike the United Kingdom, and 
similarly to southern European countries – by the States that are applying the neo-
performative model has been highlighted. This is perhaps the best evidence that the legal 
system established does not predetermine once and forever the whole operation of the spatial 
governance system and, therefore, cannot become an excuse to give up on change. 
 
 
Figure 6: Three models of spatial governance systems (adaptation on: Knieling et al., 2016). 
 
However, it must be observed that the systems of spatial governance and planning are very 
complex social constructs, which can be seen as an «institutional technology of government», 
operating «as a hinge between the government system […] and the spatial production and 
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consumption system» (Mazza, 2003, p. 54, translated). This means that spatial governance 
and planning not only contribute to design citizenship (Mazza, 2015), but also by their nature 
are themselves shaped by the social structure and change (Nadin & Stead, 2008, 2009). The 
concept of “institutional technology” helps to explain the historical insurgence of spatial 
planning practices and cultures within the wider processes of institutionalization and, in doing 
so, leads to the representation of the concerned systems as end-products of creative selection 
processes of trial and error based on «a) first, the generation of variety (in particular, a variety 
of practices and rules); b) second, competition and reduction of the variety (of rules) via 
selection; c) third, propagation and some persistence of the solution (the system of rules) 
selected» (Moroni, 2010, p. 279). Such a possible representation (Figure 7) may of course 
open various considerations on conditions and possible drivers of change (Stead, 2012; 
Cotella et al., 2016), without forgetting that, after all, «the raw material on which institutional 
evolution acts is supplied by human trial and error, by intentional agents trying to deal with 
problems» (Moroni, 2010, p. 280).  
 
 
Figure 7: Formation and change of a system of spatial governance and planning 
(adaptation on: Janin Rivolin, 2012). 
 
In general, a spatial governance and planning system is potentially oriented, like any other 
technology, to renovate its own “capacities”: in this case the command options of the 
“government system” on the “spatial production and consumption system”, which in general 
is led by individual profit and thus equally pressed by the search for innovation (Harvey, 
1989; Lefebvre, 1992). Paraphrasing Schumpeter (1949), a planning system is continuously 
called upon to provide the public action with a «creative response», because any simply 
«adaptive response» is driven to leave the production of space the permanent hostage of 
prevailing interests of individual profit. However, «in practice the process to adopt changes is 
rather slow and restrained by high transactions costs» (Fürst, 2009, p. 31), because of path 
dependence (Booth, 2011; Sorensen, 2015), the complexity of institutional processes and the 
conditions imposed by political conflict and economic dynamics, against the background of 
innate social struggle for land use control (Plotkin, 1987). Against this backdrop, «the loss of 
legitimacy of existing institutions resulting from crisis allows a heightened opportunity for 
policy entrepreneurs or other actors to reshape existing institutions and create new 
arrangements»; as far as spatial governance is concerned, «[p]articularly important is the 
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specification of the rules that apply to new capital investment in urban space, and the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of such investment» (Sorensen, 2015, pp. 25-26). In this 
light, the most dreadful suspicion is that more obsolete systems of spatial governance and 
planning that limit the socioeconomic development of southern European cities and countries 
will have a hope to be substantially changed only if the social costs of crisis will overcome 
the “transactions costs” that have prevented so far this opportunity. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As argued in the previous sections, comprehending the variety of the European context can be 
valuable to understand how different systems of spatial governance and planning may have 
different impacts on the global crisis, especially with regard to its effects in terms of spatial 
justice. In this context, the southern European countries, which are more seriously affected by 
the crisis, are still ruled by “conformative” systems of spatial governance and planning. These 
systems, in spite of the most ancient customs and noble expectations, prove incapable of 
ensuring effective public governance of the “production of space”, especially in the 
contemporary socio-economic contexts. The extreme complexity of the matter and the 
absence of more systematic analysis prevent more specific correlations. It seems difficult to 
deny, however, that a balanced social distribution of profits and losses resulting from the 
spatial development can be achieved with some effectiveness if – as these systems determine 
– new rights on land use and on spatial development are allocated in advance of an effective 
public control of development projects. Ultimately, it «seems that when municipalities fix 
development possibilities early in the development process, this might stimulate land price 
increases and might also lead to the loss of a valuable negotiation tool. Municipalities might 
be giving away their “treasure”: that of being the only institution entitled to decide, with 
certain discretionary powers, if, when and what is allowed to be built» (Muñoz Gielen & 
Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1126). 
 
This difficulty appears to have been understood in other European countries, which have 
modified in time the operation of respective systems of spatial governance and planning, and 
that seem less affected by the crisis of these years. Their “performative” systems, in particular, 
ensure that in one way (e.g. the United Kingdom) or another (e.g. various north-western 
European countries) new rights on propriety are assigned only after that the related projects of 
development have been controlled by the public authority and appropriately renegotiated to 
rebalance profits and losses within the urban community. Of course, also these systems are 
seriously threatened by the pressure of crisis (Buitelaar & Bregman, 2016) and can be 
improved. The effects of crisis have suggested, looking for instance at the British system, 
possible reforms in order to achieve systems that are less «growth dependent» in future 
(Rydin, 2013). This kind of proposals assumes, however, that a minimum of «planning gain» 
is already ensured by the «regulatory control» allowed by the system that needs improvement. 
In other words, one precondition is that «[p]olicies that weaken this regulatory control, for 
example, by establishing a firm presumption in favour of development» (ibid., p. 45) are 
prevented already by the system, which does not happen in the conformative model.  
 
In general, the coexistence of such different systems of spatial governance in Europe 
increases the problems of effectiveness of the EU policies (Janin Rivolin, 2008). Broadening 
our attention beyond Europe leads us to acknowledge that the traditional conformative system 
of spatial governance and planning is arguably still prevalent in the world, which may help 
explain to the vast majority of careless planning scholars (Siemiatycki & Siemiatycki, 2016) 
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both the overall magnitude of the crisis and its duration. After all, the change of these systems, 
as “institutional technologies”, depends on highly complex social constructions, permeated 
everywhere at any time by endemic struggle for land use control. In conclusion, if «a bridge 
exists from the technical knowledge that planners embrace to the institutional change that 
seems necessary for planning to be effective» (Beauregard, 2005, p. 206), this is made by an 
increased public awareness of the crucial role of the whole system of spatial governance and 
planning for economic, social and even political life. The current responsibility of the 
planning scholars has perhaps to deal with this, rather than continuing to feed a «sophisticated 
international academic discourse aiming to bridge theory and practice and to come from 
knowledge to action» (Kunzmann, 2016, p. 1317) and new urban developments.  
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